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Introduction
Headlines are a beacon of bad news: Leaders in Bosnia are Said to Steal Up
to $1 Billion,2 Ukraine Corruption Probe Finds Huge Funds Transfer: Authori-
ties Believe Ex-Prime Minister Moved $700 Million.3 Similar headlines
describe corruption outside Eastern Europe.4 The fledgling free-market
* Professor, Law Department, Bentley College. B.A., University of Pennsylvania;
J.D., Boston University School of Law.
1. This title refers to Nikolai Chernyshevsky's classic work. NIKOLAI
CHERNYSHEVSKY, WHAT Is To BE DONE? (Michael R Katz, trans., Cornell U. Press 1989).
Originally published in 1863, it heralded the idea that "new people," educated and
driven by reason, would radically transform the Tsarist Russian society. See Michael R.
Katz & William G. Wagner, Introduction to CHERNYSHEVSKY, supra, at 20-25. Lenin
recognized Chernyshevsky as "the greatest and most talented representative of socialism
before Marx." Id. at 32. This book will be used as a touchstone to explore how to
address the problem of bribery-through "new people" or some more realistic approach.
2. See Chris Hedges, Leaders in Bosnia are Said to Steal Up to $1 Billion, N.Y. TiMES,
Aug. 17, 1999, at Al (discussing the magnitude of the international aid fraud in Bosnia).
3. See Michael Allen &Jeanne Whalen, Ukraine Corruption Probe Finds Huge Funds
Transfer: Authorities Believe Ex-Prime Minister Moved $700 Million, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19,
1999, at A16 (illustrating the difficulty of tracking fund transfers).
4. See, e.g., Gail Edmondson et al., High Anxiety in Paris, Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 1999,
at 58-59 (discussing the corruption investigations in France); Larry Rohter, Hospitals
Blighted by a Venezuelan Disease, Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1999, at A4 (noting that so
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economies in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) are more fragile, however, because they are trying
to rebuild an infrastructure without a tax base to raise revenue. The cost of
bribery may prevent those countries' attempts to dramatically change their
economic, political, and legal systems to form a free market economy.
They have abandoned the philosophy that the state will provide everything,
but left no safety net for the care of pensioners and the unemployed.
Although a corruption scandal in France or Germany may change the gov-
ernment in the next election, the increased costs from bribery in Eastern
Europe, the Baltic States, and the CIS could potentially reverse their entire
political and economic direction.
A 1999 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
survey of 3000 companies doing business in these countries revealed a
"bribe tax" and its pernicious connection to economic development.5 Brib-
ery and corruption threaten the ability of these countries to complete their
work toward privatization by distorting the development process and dis-
couraging private investment. 6 This situation perpetuates a vicious and
unproductive cycle that opens the door for people to remember nostalgi-
much equipment disappeared from hospitals in Venezuela that patients must bring their
own supplies); Norimitsu Onishi, Nigeria Leader Amazes Many with Strong Anti-Graft
Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at Al (chronicling newly-elected Nigerian President
Olusegun Obasanjo's investigation into corruption and the freezing of the Abacha fam-
ily's bank accounts, rumored to exceed $2 billion); John Carreyrou, Suez Lyonnaise Unit
in Bribery Probe: Belgium's Tractebel Faces Scrutiny Over Payments to Kazak Businessmen,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1999, at A13 (discussing Belgian investigations into Tractebel's
alleged payments to secure a gas pipeline contract in Kazakhstan); Roger Cohen &John
Tagliabue, Big Kickbacks Under Kohl Reported: Investigators Estimate $70 Million Was Paid
to Middlemen, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000, at All (reporting allegations of kickbacks for
government sales in Germany); Elisabeth Rosenthal, As It Takes On Corruption, China
Executes an Official, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 9, 2000, at A10 (discussing the execution of a
former public official in China for taking bribes). Also, Transparency International, see
Transparency Int'l, Programmes and Activities (last modified May 22, 2000) <http://
www.transparency.de/activities/index.html> [hereinafter Transparency Int'l, Program-
mes], conducted a survey that ranked countries according to the incidence of bribe
offers by the nation's companies. See Transparency Int'l, Bribe Payers Survey (Jan. 20,
2000) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/bps.html> [hereinafter Trans-
parency Int'l, Bribe Payers Survey]. On a scale of zero to ten-ten representing "a per-
ceived level of negligible bribery," the United States and Germany scored 6.2. See id. Of
other leading exporters, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
Austria, Canada, Australia, and Sweden scored higher respectively-meaning private sec-
tor leaders in emerging market economies viewed companies from those nations as less
likely to tender bribes. See id.
5. See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEv., TRANSITION REPORT 1999: TEN
YEARS OF TRANSITION 123-26 (1999) [hereinafter TRANSITION REPORT].
6. See id.; see also Beverley Earle, The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the
Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT'L. L. 207, 221-23 (1996); Philip M. Nichols, Regulating
Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L.
257, 274-79 (1999). But cf. Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat
to Global Harmony, 20 Mich. J. Int'l. L. 419, 436 (1999) (noting that small-scale bribery
may benefit the host country's economy). For a thorough discussion of the connection
between corruption and development, see SUSAN ROsE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND Gov-
ERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFoRM (1991).
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cally the communist philosophy: "From each according to his ability, to
each according to his need." It also creates opportunities for unscrupulous
and criminal elements to take advantage of the society's lack of laws and
enforcement mechanisms. If transition to a market economy proceeds
slowly without tangible results and only corrupt individuals prosper, there
is a danger that countries may abandon their attempts to transform.
This Article will examine the question of "What is to be done?"7 in
three parts. Section I will trace the history of anti-corruption efforts and
describe the current international initiatives. Section II will identify pat-
terns from the EBRD data on the cost of bribery in Eastern Europe, the
Baltic States, and the CIS. Finally, Section III will suggest a framework for
addressing bribery in those transition economies.
I. History and Current International Efforts
Although bribery is universally condemned,8 moral condemnation has
done little to eradicate the practice.9 Several scholars defend some forms
of bribery as reflective of the host country's culture and label extraterrito-
rial anti-bribery legislation "moral imperialism."'10 More scholars, and
increasingly businesspeople and politicians, have rejected this approach in
favor of the view that bribery impedes a country's development." The
history of bribery and the international response may be divided into four
stages of development:
Stage 1: Before the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 12
Stage 2: U.S. Passage of the FCPA
Stage 3: International Efforts Culminate in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD
Convention) 13
Stage 4: Post-OECD Convention: Implementation, Enforcement, and Expan-
sion
A. Stage 1: Before the FCPA
Bribes have plagued the United States since its earliest beginnings. John
Noonan remarked:
7. See supra note 1.
8. See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984) (discussing the history and
treatment of bribes by different cultures).
9. See generally Earle, supra note 6 (discussing the effect of moral suasion on
bribery).
10. See Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restrictions of Bribery: A Premature Evocation
of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALEJ. INT'L. L. 223, 231 (1999).
11. See generally SusAN RosE-AcKERMAN, supra note 6; CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997).
12. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78).
13. See Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
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Bribes are a species of reciprocity. Human life is full of reciprocities.
The particular reciprocities that count as bribes in particular cultures are
distinguished by intentionality, form, and context....
For Americans generally, bribery has nearly always had a high interest.
Treason and bribery are the two crimes mentioned by name in the Constitu-
tion. Charges of corruption have often decided elections. 14
Moreover, though not a complete history of bribery, Noonan traced the
existence of bribes back to 3000 BC. 15
In the latter half of the twentieth century, a debate ensued about the
role and precise evil of bribery. 16 Colin Leys wrote in 1965, What Is the
Problem About Corruption?17 He noted that "loin occasion, bribes pro-
moted efficiency and socially useful administration" 18 and served the "per-
sistent integrative needs of society."'19 Similarly, James Wilson argued that
"[h]onest graft brought profit to the office-holder and no harm to the pub-
lic." 20 James C. Scott described corruption as "the alternative means of
interest articulation."2 1
However, these views of bribery as a benign practice did not prevail.
In the United States, efforts expanded to criminalize bribery domesti-
cally.22 While not all statutes addressed grand corruption, the trend
emphasized the legislative recognition that bribery distorts economic trans-
actions even at the daily transactional level.23
This preoccupation with everyday bribery reflects an important pre-
requisite for any serious effort to eradicate corruption. Hillel Halkin
described it as a "childish fear of corruption."2 4
The time to be worried about [corruption] is not when the newspapers are
full of it, but when they aren't. In either case you can be sure it is there, but
only when public officials are being investigated and brought to trial for
14. See NOONAN, supra note 8, at xiii, xvi.
15. See id. at 3-30.
16. For an interesting colloquy on the cultural aspects of bribery, compare Timothy
L. Fort &JamesJ. Noone, Gifts, Bribes, and Exchange: Relationships in Non-Marhet Econo-
mies & Lessons for Pax E-Commercia, 33 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 515 (2000), with Clyde D.
Stoltenberg, Globalization, "Asian Values," and Economic Reform: The Impact of Tradition
and Change on Ethical Values in Chinese Business, 33 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 711 (2000).
17. Colin Leys, What Is the Problem About Corruption?, 3 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 215,
218-23 (1965).
18. NOONAN, supra note 8, at 547 (citing Leys, supra note 17, at 218-23).
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing James Q. Wilson, Corruption Is Not Always Scandalous, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1968, (Magazine), reprinted in THEFT OF THE CITY: READINGS ON CORRUPTION IN
URBAN AMERICA 29-32 (John A. Gardiner & David J. Olson eds., 1974).
21. See NOONAN, supra note 8, at 549 (citingjx Es C. ScorT, COMPARATIVE POLIMcAL
CORRUION (1972)).
22. See NOONAN, supra note 8, at 578.
23. See id. (referencing state statutes that criminalized bribery of chauffeurs and
gardeners). For a discussion of grand corruption, see Steven R. Salbu, A Delicate Bal-
ance: Legislation, Institutional Change and Transnational Bribery, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.
657 (2000).
24. See Hillel Halkin, The Virtues of a 'Childish Fear of Corruption,' WALL ST. J., Mar.
29, 2000, at A22.
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even minor malfeasance is there the slightest hope of combating it.2 5
The United States' "childish fear of corruption" led to the development of
the next stage.
B. Stage 2: U.S. Passage of the FCPA
In 1977, the United States passed the FCPA after numerous revelations
about Watergate and corporate slush funds used to pay overseas bribes and
hide illegal campaign contributions. The high profile resignation of Vice
President Spiro Agnew was connected to payments he accepted while the
Governor of Maryland. The United States elected Jimmy Carter, as Presi-
dent, seemingly in part because of his platform to change Washington and
his reputation as a peanut farmer and naval officer who was beyond
reproach. In this spirit of cleaning up Washington, Congress passed the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, criminalizing payments offered or
tendered "to obtain or retain business," and applied the statute
extraterritorially.
Other countries did not have analogous legislation. U.S. businesses
complained that corruption and bribery were an economic reality and the
FCPA limitations on bribes placed U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage
in international and foreign trade. No international movement to change
other countries' laws domestically or collectively seemed imminent.2 6
In 1988, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments (FCPA
Amendments) passed, making it easier for companies to comply with the
FCPA.2 7 Under the new law, U.S. businesses could make payments for
police protection, mail delivery, or transport of good without violating the
law.28 The legislation recognized that "de minimis" grease payments were
probably occurring and shifted the legal focus to "corrupt" payments that
distorted competition.
C. Stage 3: International Efforts Culminate in the OECD Convention
After the passage of the FCPA Amendments, other countries realized that
the United States would not retreat from its attempt to criminalize bribery
internationally. When elected President of the United States in 1992, Bill
Clinton wanted to continue the push to level the international playing field
for U.S. companies. He charged his staff to work through the OECD.
Many commentators thought these efforts would be a futile exercise
because bribery had existed for thousands of years. Yet, the call for reform
was no longer a single voice.
25. Id.
26. For a more detailed discussion of the FCPA's history, see Earle, supra note 6, at
207-11, 224-25.
27. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1415.
28. For a more detailed discussion of the FCPA Amendments, see generally Beverley
H. Earle, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: The Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act's Focus on Improving Investment Opportunities, 37 CLay. ST. L. REv. 549 (1989).
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Founded in 1994, Transparency International (TI), a non-governmen-
tal organization similar in structure to Amnesty International, wanted to
expose the existence and cost of corruption in different countries. A group
of distinguished economists and political leaders joined with TI to amass
data that would convincingly demonstrate the cost of bribery. The cam-
paign against corruption no longer seemed like some quixotic tilt at wind-
mills; rather it became a focused two-pronged effort to internationally
recognize and protest the cost of bribery.
Transparency International's data revealed "Bribonomics. ' '29 Bribery
deprives companies of fair competition and inflates the price of goods.
Bribes corrupt officials into selecting inferior companies or bids; increase
contract prices; and skew the object of contracts toward projects where
bribes can be hidden, which negatively impacts education contracts, but
bolsters airplane bids and massive construction projects.30
Recognition of the deleterious impact of bribery culminated in the
OECD Convention, a treaty signed by all twenty-nine member countries
and five non-members.3 1 Signatory countries must implement domestic
anti-bribery legislation. 32 In 1998, the United States passed conforming
amendments for the FCPA-3 3
Other international organizations also started to address corruption.
The Organization of American States (OAS) passed the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption in 1996 that prohibited giving or receiving
bribes.3 4 Also in 1996, the United Nations issued the Declaration against
Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions. 35 Fur-
thermore, the International Chamber of Commerce revised its 1977 Rules
of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery to encourage voluntary codes
of conduct and close contact with the World Trade Organization (WTO).3 6
This convergence of multinational efforts signals a symbolic as well as a
real shift in attitudes toward bribery.
29. See Bribonomics, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 86; cf. Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 QJ. ECON. 599 (1993).
30. See Bribonomics, supra note 29.
31. See Anti-Corruption Unit, OECD, Frequently Asked Questions (last modified Sept.
14, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/faq.htm#14> (listing Argentina, Bra-
zil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Republic as the non-member signatories).
32. See OECD Convention, supra note 13, art. 2, 37 I.L.M. at 4.
33. See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-366, 112 Stat. 3302.
34. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 26, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
724. For discussion of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, see David
Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach: The C2 Princi-
ples (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL Irr'L LJ. 593 (2000); Barbara Crutchfield
George & Kathleen Lacey, A Coalition of Industrialized nations, Developing Nations, Mul-
tilateral Development Banks, and Non-Governmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement
to Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 33 CORNELL 'N'L LJ. 547 (2000).
35. G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/51/191 (1996) [hereinafter U.N. Delcaration].
36. See International Chamber of Com., Extortion and Bribery in International Busi-
ness Transactions (visited Sept. 24, 2000) <http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_
rules/rules/1999/briberydoc99.asp>.
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D. Stage 4: Post-OECD Convention: Implementation, Enforcement, and
Expansion
In this current stage, the task is to expand the list of countries that have
ratified the OECD Convention and secure enforcement by monitoring
nations' efforts to enact and administer domestic implementing legislation.
Otherwise, the signatories must struggle with how to ensure compliance
globally. A tremendous first step occurred when the OECD Convention
entered into force in 1999.37 In Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic,
Poland, and Hungary ratified the OECD Convention as member states; the
Slovak Republic and Bulgaria ratified it as non-members.38 This multilat-
eral effort advances the signatory countries toward a minimum standard.
3 9
The World Bank, which bankrolled initial development in Eastern
Europe, unwittingly contributed to corruption in those countries through
inadequate financial controls. Despite allegations that its resources have
been siphoned from projects to individuals' pockets, 40 the World Bank
belatedly committed itself to rooting out corruption by launching a serious
multi-pronged anti-corruption drive.4 1 In 1998, the World Bank created a
corruption hotline and Oversight Committee on Fraud and Corruption.4 2
Also, the Bank announced a zero tolerance policy for contractors found to
have committed fraud or bribery4 3 and created a Sanction Committee,
37. See OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery to Enter into Force on 15
February 1999 (Dec. 17, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/media/release/nw98-124a.htm>.
38. See Anti-Corruption Unit, OECD, Implementation of OECD Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (last modified Sept. 14, 2000) <http://
www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/annex2.htm>; OECD, About OECD - Member Countries
(last modified Sept. 19, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/about/general/member-countries.
htm>.
39. The goal is not zero corruption because the cost would be too high to get to that
point. For a discussion of the problems and costs in achieving zero corruption, see
generally FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY:
How CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE (1996); ROBERT KLITGAARD,
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 21-30 (1988).
40. See, e.g., Execution of Foreign Aid to Russia Opens the Door to Corruption, Experts
Say World Bank Is Faulted for Administration of Loans, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATcH, July 23,
2000, at A5, available in 2000 WL 3538148.
41. See generally World Bank, Anticorruption (visited Sept. 24, 2000) <http://
wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/>. For a discussion of the role of fund-
ing organizations in combating corruption, see Miguel Schloss, Luncheon Address, 33
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 469 (2000).
42. See World Bank, Preventing Corruption in Bank Projects (visited Sept 24, 2000)
<http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/prevent.html>.
43. The Bank's Procurement Guidelines prohibit "corrupt or fraudulent practices"
and provide for audits to ensure compliance. See World Bank, Guidelines: Procurement
Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits § 1.15 (Jan. 1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/
html/opr/procure/intro.html#p115>. The Procurement Guidelines define corrupt prac-
tices as "offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any thing of value to influence the
action of a public official in the procurement process or in contract execution." Id.
Fraudulent practices include:
misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement process or the
execution of a contract to the detriment of the Borrower, and includes collusive
practices among bidders (prior to or after bid submission) designed to establish
bid prices at artificial, non-competitive levels and to deprive the Borrower of the
benefits of free and open competition.
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which has debarred several contractors to date.44 The World Bank aug-
mented its anti-corruption work by promoting ethics education around the
world.45 If corruption will hinder World Bank-funded development and
affect a country's ability to secure scarce monetary aid, governments may
be motivated to change.
Thus, the World Bank can play a critical role in fighting corruption.
For example, Philippine President Estrada asked the World Bank for help
in fighting domestic corruption.46 In response, Vinay Bhargava, World
Bank Country Director, noted the Bank's basic strategy "to reduce opportu-
nities and motivation for corruption and make corruption a high-risk low-
reward activity" through "policy reforms and deregulation .... campaign
finance [reform,] . . .increas[ed] public oversight[,] . . .budget processes
[reform,] . . .improv[ed] meritocracy in civil service[,] . . .targeting [of]
selected departments and agencies[,] ... enhanc[ed] sanctions[,] . . .part-
nerships with the private sector, . . . [and] judicial reforms."4 7 He
remarked that "[o]ur analysis also indicates that the Philippines today
meets many preconditions that offer promise for a successful anticorrup-
tion campaign. Global experience also indicates that specific, tailor-made
programs, firmly set in the country's culture and history and a sustained
political will and leadership are the essential ingredients to success."'48
In contrast, the OECD seems to be designed as a forum for discussion,
not action. Yet, the values espoused by the member countries: open mar-
ket, democratic pluralism, respect for human rights, transparency, and
peer review are important to the economic development of Eastern
Europe.49 As of April 2000, twenty-three countries have changed their
domestic laws to comply with the OECD Convention. 50
Transparency International provides further pressure for change by
monitoring nations' activities and publishing the Bribe Payers Index (BPI)
Id.
44. See World Bank, supra note 43; World Bank, Listing of Debarred Firms (last modi-
fied Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/opr/procure/debarr.html>.
45. See World Bank, Governance & Anti-Corruption Resource Center (visited Sept. 24,
2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/index.htm>.
46. See World Bank, Social Policy and Governance - Combating Corruption in the Phil-
ippines (Nov. 30, 1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/eapsocial/library/corruption.
html>.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See OECD, About OECD - Member Countries, supra note 38. The original 20
OECD members were from Western Europe and North America. See id. Japan joined in
1964; Finland joined in 1969; Australia joined in 1971; New Zealand joined in 1973;
Mexico joined in 1994; the Czech Republic joined in 1995; and Hungary, Korea, and
Poland joined in 1996. See id. The OECD also works with non-members focusing on
promoting policy-based activities and assisting specific countries or regions. See id.
50. See Anti-Corruption Unit, OECD, Implementation of OECD Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, supra note 38 (listing Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, the Slovak Republic, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
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and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). 51 The increase in TI chapters
from sixty-six to seventy-seven during 1999 demonstrates the dramatic
growth and interest in anti-corruption efforts. In many ways, Transparency
International laid the groundwork for the OECD Convention by shaping
public opinion.52
Although an untapped resource, the United Nations is a fourth organi-
zation with potential for an impact on corruption. Normally, the U.N.
Security Council deals only with issues that threaten peace and security.
Yet, in an interesting development, Vice President Al Gore, motivated in
part by election-year politics, convened the Security Council to discuss the
AIDS issue in Africa, claiming it has "become a threat to global security
and stability."53 He noted that "experts predict that more will die of AIDS
in the next decade than have died in all the wars of the 20th century."5 4
It is possible that bribery, like AIDS, could be considered a threat to
security-qualified for a U.N. Security Council session or action. The
United Nations could also consider establishing an international tribunal,
similar to a War Crimes tribunal. 55 However, it is unlikely that countries
would be willing to relinquish jurisdiction over these politically-sensitive
prosecutions, dealing with money and public officials, to international
tribunals.
To complement the OECD Convention, the Council of Europe, a forty-
one-member-state organization that predates the European Community,
adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption on November 4,
1998, and twenty-one European states signed it onJanuary 27, 1999.56 In
May 1998, the Council created the Group of States against Corruption
(GRECO) to combat corruption through a system of peer review and pres-
sure.57 In addition, the European Union (EU) passed the Convention on
the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Commu-
nities or Officials of Member States of the European Union (EU Conven-
tion).5 8 Although the EU Convention did not reach extraterritorial
51. Transparency Int'l, Corruption Perceptions Index/Bribe Payers Index (last modi-
fied Aug. 23, 2000) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/>.
52. For a discussion of Transparency International's role, see Schloss, supra note 41,
at 469; George & Lacey, supra note 34, at 547.
53. Katharine Q. Seelye, Gore to Preside at Security Council Session on AIDS Crisis,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 2000, at A6.
54. Id.
55. For discussion of a criminal court for corruption, see Brian C. Harms, Note,
Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm: A New Multi-Layered
Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL Ir'L LJ. 159, 197-202 (2000).
56. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173,
available in Council of Eur., Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Jan. 27, 1999)
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/173.htmr>; see Council of Eur.,
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of a Treaty (last modified Sept. 25, 2000) <http://
conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm> (listing signatories).
57. See Committee of Ministers, Council of Eur., Multidisciplinary Group on Corrup-
tion: Draft Agreement Establishing the Group of States Against Corruption (Apr. 2, 1998)
<http://www.coe.fr/cm/reports/cmdocs/1998/98cm54.htm>
58. 1997 OJ. (C 195) 2-11.
Cornell International Law Journal
corruption, it was an important recognition that bribery of EU officials or
Member States' public officials was a criminal action.
In the spring of 2000, Vladimir Putin, then-Acting-President of Russia,
wrote an "open letter" calling for a "dictatorship of law."5 9 While this mon-
iker sounds ominous and vague, Putin tried to quell fears: "Only by pro-
tecting the principles of democracy in all spheres-in mass media, in
courts, in law-enforcement agencies-can we protect an ordinary man from
witch-hunting and persecutions." 60 Putin plans to strengthen the court
system through higher judges' salaries and other reforms and decrease tax
evasion through tax identification numbers and increased enforcement of
Customs duties.6 1
Russia's civil service reforms are models of a key component in the
strategy for combating corruption detailed by Susan Rose-Ackerman. 62
Also, these reforms contribute to the mounting evidence that nations are
employing multi-pronged efforts to multilateraleralize the commitment
against bribery. The efficacy of these efforts can only be evaluated on a
continuing basis.
II. An Examination of the Bribery and Corruption Data on Eastern
Europe, the Baltic States, and the Commonwealth of
Independent States
One of the difficulties in examining corruption reform is the lack of data.
Frank Anechiarico and James Jacobs argue:
An enormous barrier to evaluating the efficacy of corruption controls is
the lack of basic data, indeed, practically any data, and an absence of indica-
tors about the costs of corruption and the costs and benefits of corruption
control. How can we rationally set policy on corruption control when we
know virtually nothing about its underlying reality; .. .we operate in a
knowledge vacuum concerning both corruption and corruption control.
Therefore, establishing a methodology for constructing indicators of the cor-
ruption rate and of the costs and benefits of corruption controls is abso-
lutely vital if we are to advance policy analysis.63
In conjunction with information collected by Transparency Interna-
tional, the EBRD's study (Transition Report) provided this much needed
59. See Paul Starobin & Sabrina Tavernise, Will Putin Crack Down?: Critics Worry
He'll Wound Democracy, Bus. WK., April 3, 2000, at 54, 55; Jeanne Whalen, Many Rus-
sians Look to Putin to Bring Justice: Corruption Drains Hope from Lives of the Powerless,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2000, at A24 (discussing the connection between law and corrup-
tion); cf.. Serge Schmemann, What Makes Nations Turn Corrupt?: Reformers Worry that
Payoffs and Theft May Be Accepted as Normal, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 28, 1999, at B1l, B13
(discussing then-President Boris Yeltsin's failure to send a strong message against
corruption).
60. Starobin & Tavernise, supra note 59, at 55 (citing a contemporaneous radio
address by Putin).
61. See id.
62. See Ros-AcKERmAN, supra note 6, at 64-88.
63. ANECHIARCO & JACOBS, supra note 39, at 195.
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data. 64 The Transition Report identified four major lessons for successful
transition: (1) "transition will be a long and difficult process;" (2) countries
cannot avoid key decisions-success is not just based on where a country
started; (3) laws and regulations are necessary, but not sufficient-society
as a whole must demand "good governance" and encourage competition
because these forces continue rather than "undermine" the transition econ-
omy; (4) new firms will be the "driving force behind economic growth" and
essential to restructuring efforts in the older "industrial and agriculture"
sectors.65
Since law is a country's foundation, transition efforts must be legis-
lated and enforced for investors and businesses to feel secure. For many of
these countries, communism meant dismantling or significantly modifying
any previous legal system. In Russia's case, a legal system never developed
because none ever existed during feudal times and the communist revolu-
tion occurred in 1917. Thus, these countries, in transitioning to a free
market economy, had to build a legal system that recognized private prop-
erty and offered the supporting legal paradigms, such as contract and
bankruptcy law.
In the Transition Report, the enterprises surveyed were asked their
beliefs regarding the adequacy of each nation's legal system to protect prop-
erty rights.66 The results are surprising. Countries with a 70-80% confi-
dence rating included Estonia, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia; 67 and, more
surprisingly, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.68 The low confidence in the
Czech Republic-40-50%-can be attributed to problems with the protec-
tion of investors at the time of the survey.6 9 On the other hand, Russia's
dismal showing was not a shock.70
Without confidence in the legal structure, businesses will not take the
risk of investing in the country. Countries have improved, but national
legal changes must continue to progress. The data illustrates that busi-
nesspeople still do not have full confidence in the existing legal systems to
handle disputes and safeguard business interests. Clearly progress has
been made but further reforms need to continue. Without legal protection,
businesses will not flourish and investment will be deterred.
64. TRaNSInON REPORT, supra note 5; supra note 5 and accompanying text..
65. TRANsION REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
66. See id. at 117.
67. See infra tbl.1.
68. See TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 5, at 116-17, 117 n.4 (noting that Azerbaijan
and Uzbekistan do not fit an otherwise noticeable pattern in the data); infra tbl.1.
69. See TRANMTION REPORT, supra note 5, at 44 ("Effectiveness scores dropped slightly
in 1999 for a few jurisdictions. This was notable in the Czech Republic, which may
reflect experiences of foreign investors in trying to enforce their rights as secured credi-
tors and minority shareholders in courts.").
70. See infra tbl. L
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Table 1
Security of Property and Contract Rights
Percentage of enterprises agreeing with the proposition "that the legal sys-
tem would uphold their contract and property rights in business
disputes."7 1
% Agreeing Country
70-80 Estonia
Uzbekistan
Poland
Slovenia
Azerbaijan
Hungary
60-70 Croatia
Slovak Republic
Georgia
50-60 Bulgaria
Armenia
Romania
40-50 Belarus
Czech Republic
Kazakhstan
30-40 Lithuania
Kyrgyzstan
20-30 Russia
Ukraine
Moldova
Using other indicators of economic and legal progress, EBRD research-
ers revealed that smaller firms pay a higher percentage of bribes and a
larger percentage of their annual revenue for bribes.72 The percentage of
companies reporting that they must frequently bribe public officials
ranged from 7% to 50%.7 3 As with other rankings, Estonia is a leader in
lower levels of bribe activity. Poland and Hungary had higher incidence of
bribery than Russia; however, data on the percentage of a company's
annual revenue devoted to bribes suggests that despite the frequency of
bribe requests in Poland and Hungary, businesses in Russia must pay
larger bribes because bribes account for a greater percentage of a com-
pany's expenses.7 4
Comparing the bribe tax75 with the time tax7 6 -the percentage of time
that top executives spend dealing with state bureaucrats-yields other
interesting results. Despite a comparable bribe tax to Russia, the Czech
71. TR~AusnnoN REPORT, supra note 5, at 117 chart.6.1.
72. See infra tbl.2 (estimating precise numbers from a graph in original source).
73. See infra tbl.3.
74. Compare infra tbl.3, with infra tbl.4.
75. See infra tbl.4.
76. See infra tbl.5.
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Republic has the lowest time tax on senior management.77 Estonia's firms
suffer a slightly higher time tax than expected, given Estonia's more
favorable ratings in other categories. 78 Finally, Russia's staggering time
tax illustrates the confusing morass of bureaucracy a business must navi-
gate in that country, which deters entrepreneurial activity.79
Table 2
Bribe Tax as a Function of Firm Size0
% Firms Paying Bribes
Firm Size (Employees) % of Annual Revenue Frequently
Small (less than 50) 5.5% 36%
Medium (50-499) 4.0% 26%
Large (500 or more) 2.9% 19%
Table 3
Frequency of Bribes
Percentage of firms bribing frequently "to get things done."8 '
Slovenia 7.7
Estonia 12.9
Belarus 14.2
Croatia 17.7
Lithuania 23.2
Kazakhstan 23.7
Bulgaria 23.9
Czech Republic 26.3
Kyrgyzstan 26.9
Russia 29.2
Hungary 31.3
Poland 32.7
Moldova 33.3
Slovak Republic 34.6
Ukraine 35.3
Georgia 36.8
Armenia 40.3
Uzbekistan 46.6
Romania 50.9
Azerbaijan 59.3
77. Compare infra tbl.4, with infra tbl.5.
78. Compare supra tbl.1, and infra tbls.3-4, with infra tbl.5.
79. See infra tbl.5.
80. TR ASMON REPORT, supra note 5, at 125 chart.6.10.
81. Id. at 125 tbl.6.3.
Cornell International Law Journal
Table 4
Bribe Tax as a Percentage of Annual Revenues 8 2
Table 5
Time Tax on Management
Percentage of "senior management time spent ... with public officials." 83
<6% >6%<8% 8-10% >10%
Croatia Slovak Republic Poland Kyrgyzstan
Czech Republic Hungary Armenia Belarus
Azerbaijan Estonia Georgia
Slovenia Romania Uzbekistan
Bulgaria Russia
Lithuania
Moldova
Kazakhstan
Ukraine
The deleterious effect of this cycle between bribery and low invest-
ment is a downward spiral that results in stalled growth patterns.8 4 The
EBRD data supporting this correlation between growth and bribes ranks
state intervention in business decisions across seven categories, including
investment, employment, sales, mergers and acquisitions, dividends,
wages, and prices.8 5 Estonia and Poland report low state intervention
rates.8 6 Surprisingly, Russia ranks 8th, above Hungary- 17th.8 7
82. Id.
83. Id. at 124 chart.6.9.
84. See supra fig. 1.
85. See infra tbl.6 (listing only the aggregated index, not the data for individual cate-
gories). For a discussion of the connection between growth and bribes, see RosE-AcKER-
MAN, supra note 6, at 9-26; supra Part I.C.
86. See infra tbl.6.
87. See infra tbl.6.
<3.0% 3.0-4.0% 4.1-5.0% 5.1-6.0% 6.1-7.0% >8.0%
Croatia Belarus Russia Kyrgyzstan Azerbaijan Georgia
Poland Slovenia Czech Republic Uzbekistan Moldova
Estonia Bulgaria Lithuania Ukraine
Hungary Kazakhstan Armenia
Romania
Slovak Republic
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Figure 1
~~Z~Zzz~§j
Business as usual Low economic growth
Bribes commonplaceZYFewer voices for reform
New business discouraged
Table 6
State Intervention Index for Enterprise Decisions
"Percentage of firms reporting state intervention" in business decisions
about investment, employment, sales, mergers and acquisitions, dividends,
wages, and prices.88
Less than 10.0% Armenia 8.6%
10.0-19.9% Estonia 12.3%
Georgia 14.3%
Poland 15.0%
Croatia 15.2%
Bulgaria 16.1%
Azerbaijan 17.7%
Russia 18.2%
20.0-29.9% Czech Republic 20.0%
Lithuania 21.2%
Kazakhstan 22.9%
Romania 23.2%
Kyrgyzstan 22.9%
Moldova 26.1%
Slovenia 26.5%
Ukraine 29.1%
Uzbekistan 29.6%
Greater than 30.0% Hungary 41.8%
Belarus 42.5%
Slovak Republic 43.4%
It is important to compare the state intervention rates with the quality
of governance index, which rates problems of business operation and
88. TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 5, at 123 tbl.6.2.
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growth.8 9 Hungary has the highest governance index score, which offsets
the high state intervention rate because it indicates that the companies
look favorably upon the government's activities. 90 On the other hand,
despite its resources and infrastructure, Russia scored extremely poorly on
the governance index, unable to shed its ignominious reputation of
mismanagement.9 1
Table 7
Quality of Governance
Average of factors regarding problems with business "operation and
growth" (0=-major obstacles, 3=no obstacles). 92
Hungary 1.98
Slovenia 1.95
Estonia 1.95
Uzbekistan 1.83
Armenia 1.72
Poland 1.69
Slovak Republic 1.65
Czech Republic 1.59
Belarus 1.57
Lithuania 1.54
Azerbaijan 1.53
Croatia 1.43
Bulgaria 1.38
Kazakhstan 1.27
Georgia 1.24
Ukraine 1.24
Russia 1.16
Romania 1.07
Kyrgyzstan 0.85
Moldova 0.82
Transition indicators order countries according to the progress
achieved through economic reforms. 93 The highest scoring countries,
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Estonia, are believed to be exert-
ing their best efforts. 9 4 Russia's low score reflects its stalled reform pro-
gram and intractable corruption. 95
89. See infra tbl.7.
90. Compare infra tbl.7, with supra tbl.6. Hungary's microeconomic governance
score-focused on taxes and regulation-was .92; macroeconomic governance-policy
instability, inflation, and the exchange rate-1.72; physical infrastructure 2.42; and law
and order-judiciary corruption, street crime, and organized crime-2.34. See TRxsl-
TION REPORT, supra note 5, at 116 tbl.6.1.
91. See infra tbl.7. Putin claims he will use "a trusted group of former colleagues
from the K.G.B. to tackle Russia's endemic corruption." Michael R. Gordon, Putin Will
Use Ex-K.G.B. Men to Battle Graft, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 24, 2000, at Al.
92. TRANSnTON REPORT, supra note 5, at 116 tbl.6.1.
93. See id. at 25.
94. Compare id., with infra tbl.8.
95. Compare TRANsrnoN REPORT, supra note 5, at 25, with infra tbl.8.
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Table 8
Transition Indicators
Progress across the following dimensions: large-scale privatization, small-
scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberali-
zation, trade and foreign exchange, competition policy, banking reform
and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial
institutions (1=little progress, 4=substantial progress). 9 6
3.5 and greater Hungary
Poland
Czech Republic
3-3.4 Estonia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Lithuania
Croatia
2.5-3 Bulgaria
Armenia
Romania
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
2-2.5 Russia
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Uzbekistan
1-1.5 Belarus
Data on the expansion of telecommunications also provides an indica-
tion of economic growth. The ability to offer telecommunications may
seem more important to teenagers than businesses, but examining the
growth in the last ten years reveals the dramatic increase in phones per
person in Hungary and Estonia. 97 Hungary privatized its fixed-line sys-
tems in 1994 and, thereby, tripled the number of phones.9 8 This rapid
transformation is the equivalent of laying roads in the Middle Ages or
building railroads in the 1800s; it is a necessary precursor to development.
Communication is one means to combat corruption because with phone
lines comes Internet access and instant transparency. 9 9 While nationally-
supported media outlets may be reluctant to publish stories, the only deter-
rent to Internet publication is criminal prosecution or detention.
96. TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 5, at 24 tbl.2.1, 25, 118 chart.6.2.
97. See infra tbl.9 (estimating precise numbers from a graph in original source).
98. See TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 5, at 95.
99. See Carolyn Hotchkiss, The Sleeping Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End
Corruption in International Business, 17 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 108, 109 (1998)
(discussing the effects of technology on corruption reform).
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Table 9
Telephone Penetration in Transition Economies, 1989 and 1997
"Number of fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants" ranked highest to
lowest.10 0
1989 Per 100 1997 Per 100
Latvia 22.0 Slovenia 37.0
Bulgaria 22.0 Croatia 34.0
Slovenia 20.5 Bulgaria 32.5
Estonia 20.0 Estonia 31.5
Lithuania 20.0 Czech Republic 31.0
Croatia 16.5 Hungary 30.5
Czech Republic 15.0 Latvia 30.0
Armenia 15.0 Lithuania 28.0
Belarus 14.5 Slovak Republic 25.5
Macedonia 14.0 Ukraine 25.5
Russia 14.0 Belarus 22.5
Slovak Republic 12.0 FYR Macedonia 20.0
Ukraine 12.0 Poland 19.5
Romania 10.0 Russia 18.0
Moldova 9.5 Romania 17.0
Georgia 9.0 Armenia 15.0
Hungary 8.0 Moldova 14.5
Azerbaijan 7.5 Georgia 11.0
Poland 6.5 Kazakhstan 10.5
Kazakhstan 6.5 Azerbaijan 9.0
Legal transition indicators for commercial law and financial regula-
tions form a definite pattern in the leading countries: Hungary, Poland,
and Estonia, with the Czech Republic not far behind.10 1 Also, Poland
demonstrated significant growth in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
measured from 1989 to 1999, followed closely by Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and Estonia. 10 2 In contrast, Russia performed dismally. 10 3
100. TRmNSrnON REPORT, supra note 5, at 95 chart.4.9.
101. See infra tbl.10.
102. See infra tbl.11.
103. See infra tbl.11.
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Table 10
Legal Transition Indicators
Evaluating the extensiveness and effectiveness of legislation in 1999 (1=lit-
tie progress, 5=significant progress).10 4
Commercial Law Financial Regulations
4 Slovenia Hungary
Hungary Poland
FYR Macedonia Estonia
Estonia (indexed as 3 in 1998)
Bulgaria
3 Moldova Slovak Republic
Poland Slovenia
Romania Armenia
Croatia Czech Republic
Kazakhstan Moldova
Czech Republic Bulgaria
Kyrgyzstan Croatia
Latvia Kazakhstan
Russia Latvia
Slovak Republic Lithuania
Uzbekistan Romania
Armenia Russia
Azerbaijan
2 Ukraine Albania
Georgia FRY Macedonia
Albania Kyrgyzstan
Belarus Ukraine
Bosnia and Herzegovina Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan
104. TRANsITION REPORT, supra note 5, at 44 tbl.2.2.1, 46 tbl.2.2.2.
Cornell International Law Journal
Table 11
Growth in Real GDP 10 5
Estimated Real
GDP in 1998 Growth Growth Growth
(1989=100) in 1999 in 1998 in 1997
Poland 117 3.5 4.8 6.9
Slovenia 104 3.5 3.9 4.6
Slovak Republic 100 1.8 4.4 6.5
Hungary 95 3.0 5.1 4.6
Czech Republic 95 0.0 -2.3 0.3
Albania 86 8.0 8.0 -7.0
Croatia 78 -0.5 2.3 6.5
Estonia 76 0.0 4.0 10.6
Romania 76 -4.0 -7.3 -6.9
FYR Macedonia 72 0.0 2.9 1.5
Bulgaria 66 0.0 3.5 -7.0
Lithuania 65 0.0 5.2 7.4
Russia 55 0.0 -4.6 0.8
Another indicator of progress is membership in the WTO, OECD, and
EU.10 6 Country membership reflects an aspiration and determination to
meet the organization's standards. The Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia,
and Hungary participate in several of these organizations. Many organiza-
tion countries have dealt with internal corruption scandals and, therefore,
have a vested interest in minimizing the effects of international bribery and
corruption. 10 7
105. TRANSTON REPORT, supra note 5, at 73 tbl.3.1.1.
106. See infra tbl.12.
107. See supra notes 2-4.
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Table 12
Organization Membership
OECD s08  EU Applications 10 9  WTO
10
Czech Republic 1995 Poland Albania 2000
Poland 1996 Hungary Bulgaria 1996
Hungary 1996 Czech Republic Czech Republic 1995
Estonia Estonia 1999
Slovenia Georgia 2000
Cyprus Hungary 1995
Malta Kyrgyzstan 1998
Bulgaria Latvia 1999
Latvia Poland 1995
Lithuania Romania 1995
Romania Slovenia 1995
Slovak Republic
Turkey
Turkey Observer Status
Armenia
Belarus
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Croatia
Kazakhstan
Lithuania
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Transparency International provided further data in 1999 when it
published the CPI-surveying companies' perceptions of corruption in dif-
ferent countries-and BPI-ranking the frequency of bribery by exporters
from particular countries.'11 Note the United States' rank in the BPI-defi-
nitely not the unblemished reputation of Sweden." 2 In light of the recent
police department scandal in Los Angeles or the corruption trial in Rhode
Island, this ranking is not surprising." 3 In Eastern Europe, Slovenia and
Estonia scored well, but Russia and the other states of the CIS performed
substantially worse.
1 14
108. See "OECD, About OECD - Member Countries, supra note 38.
109. See International Constitutional Law, European Union Index (last modified Sept.
14, 2000) <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/eu_indx.html>.
110. See WTO, Trading into the Future - the Organization - Members (last modified
Sept. 8, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis-e/tifLe/org6-e.htm>.
111. See Transparency Int'l, supra note 51.
112. Compare infra tbl.13, with infra tbl.14.
113. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mehran, Civil Rights Officers Cleared in Shooting; Cochran Files
a Legal Claim, L.A. TiMES, Apr. 27, 2000, at A5.
114. See infra tbl.13.
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Table 13
Corruption Perceptions Index1 15
Country 1999 Standard Surveys
Rank Country CPI Score Deviation Used
1 Denmark 10.0 0.8 9
2 Finland 9.8 0.5 10
New Zealand 9.4 0.8 9
Sweden 9.4 0.6 10
Canada 9.2 0.5 10
Iceland 9.2 1.2 6
7 Singapore 9.1 0.9 12
8 Netherlands 9.0 0.5 10
9 Norway 8.9 0.8 9
Switzerland 8.9 0.6 11
11 Luxembourg 8.8 0.9 8
12 Australia 8.7 0.7 8
13 United Kingdom 8.6 0.5 11
14 Germany 8.0 0.5 10
15 Hong Kong 7.7 1.6 13
Ireland 7.7 1.9 10
17 Austria 7.6 0.8 11
18 United States 7.5 0.8 10
19 Chile 6.9 1.0 9
20 Israel 6.8 1.3 9
21 Portugal 6.7 1.0 10
22 France 6.6 1.0 10
Spain 6.6 0.7 10
24 Botswana 6.1 1.7 4
25 Japan 6.0 1.6 12
Slovenia 6.0 1.3 6
27 Estonia 5.7 1.2 7
28 Taiwan 5.6 0.9 12
29 Belgium 5.3 1.3 9
Namibia 5.3 0.9 3
31 Hungary 5.2 1.1 13
32 Costa Rica 5.1 1.5 7
Malaysia 5.1 0.5 12
115. See Transparency Int'l, supra note 51.
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Country 1999 Standard Surveys
Rank Country CPI Score Deviation Used
South Africa 5.0 0.8 12
Tunisia 5.0 1.9 3
36 Greece 4.9 1.7 9
Mauritius 4.9 0.7 4
38 Italy 4.7 0.6 10
39 Czech Republic 4.6 0.8 12
40 Peru 4.5 0.8 6
41 Jordan 4.4 0.8 6
Uruguay 4.4 0.9 3
43 Mongolia 4.3 1.0 3
44 Poland 4.2 0.8 12
Brazil 4.1 0.8 11
45 Malawi 4.1 0.5 4
Morocco 4.1 1.7 4
Zimbabwe 4.1 1.4 9
49 El Salvador 3.9 1,9 4
Jamaica 3.8 0.4 3
50 Lithuania 3.8 0.5 6
South Korea 3.8 0.9 13
53 Slovak Republic 3.7 1.5 9
54 Philippines 3.6 1.4 12
Turkey 3.6 1.0 10
56 Mozambique 3.5 2.2 3
Zambia 3.5 1.5 4
Belarus 3.4 1.4 6
China 3.4 0.7 11
58 Latvia 3.4 1.3 7
Mexico 3.4 0.5 9
Senegal 3.4 0.8 3
Bulgaria 3.3 1.4 8
Egypt 3.3 0.6 5
63 Ghana 3.3 1,0 4
Macedonia 3.3 1.2 5
Romania 3.3 1.0 6
68 Guatemala 3.2 2.5 3
Thailand 3.2 0.7 12
70 Nicaragua 3.1 2.5 3
Cornell International Law Journal
Country 1999 Standard Surveys
Rank Country CPI Score Deviation Used
71 Argentina 3.0 0.8 10
72 Colombia 2.9 0.5 11
India 2.9 0.6 14
74 Croatia 2.7 0.9 5
Ivory Coast 2.6 1.0 4
Moldova 2.6 0.8 5
Ukraine 2.6 1.4 10
Venezuela 2.6 0.8 9
Vietnam 2.6 0.5 8
80 Armenia 2.5 0.4 4
Bolivia 2.5 1.1 6
82 Ecuador 2.4 1.3 4
Russia 2.4 1.0 13
Albania 2.3 0.3 5
84 Georgia 2.3 0.7 4
Kazakhstan 2.3 1.3 5
Kyrgyzstan 2.2 0.4 4
87 Pakistan 2.2 0.7 3
Uganda 2.2 0.7 5
Kenya 2.0 0.5 4
90 Paraguay 2.0 0.8 4
Yugoslavia 2.0 1.1 6
93 Tanzania 1.9 1.1 4
Honduras 1.8 0.5 394
Uzbekistan 1.8 0.4 4
96 Azerbaijan 1.7 0.6 5
Indonesia 1.7 0.9 12
98 Nigeria 1.6 0.8 5
99 Cameroon 1.5 0.5 4
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Table 14
Bribe Payers Index
Ranking nineteen leading exporters (0=high levels of bribery, 10=negligible
bribery). 116
Rank Country Score
1 Sweden 8.3
2 Australia 8.1
Canada 8.1
4 Austria 7.8
5 Switzerland 7.7
6 Netherlands 7.4
7 United Kingdom 7.2
8 Belgium 6.8
9 Germany 6.2
United States 6.2
11 Singapore 5.7
12 Spain 5.3
13 France 5.2
14 Japan 5.1
15 Malaysia 3.9
16 Italy 3.7
17 Taiwan 3.5
18 South Korea 3.4
19 China (including Hong Kong) 3.1
In *conducting the Bribe Payers Survey, one of Transparency Interna-
tional's more disturbing findings is the perception that bribery and corrup-
tion have increased in the last five years.117 Asked what might have caused
an increase in corruption, the thirty-three percent of business leaders in
the private sector, who believed bribery had escalated, cited:
* Low public sector salaries (65%)
* Immunity of public officials (63%)
* Secrecy in government 57%)
* Worsening public procurement practices (51%)
* Privatization process (37%)
* Increase in foreign trade and investment (30%)
* Restrictions on the media (24%)
* Financial liberalization (19%)
* Multiparty elections (18%)
* Other (15%)
* Not stated (6%)118
Transparency International also noted that many survey participants
believed that bribery was not the only factor distorting fair competition." 19
For example, respondents often identified government assistance for
domestic companies as a hindrance to competition, including:
116. Id.
117. See Transparency Int'l, Bribe Payers Survey, supra note 4.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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* Diplomatic or political pressure (53%)
* Commercial pressure, dumping, and pricing issues (49%)
* Financial pressure:
Differential taxes, tariffs, Custom barriers, and subsidies (45%)
* Tied aid (36%)
* Favors and gifts (36%)
* Tied defense and arms deals (28%)
* Absence of laws, regulations, or pressures on legal issues (23%)
* Tied scholarships, educational, or healthcare programmes (16%)
* Other means (11%)
* Not stated (2%)12 0
Missing from this list are more invisible domestic subsidies, such as
the lack of U.S. sales tax on Internet purchases. Also, companies may find
ways to make legal payments that are in effect bribes. 121 For example,
making a donation to a hospital or other charitable act would "[It]urn[ I
private payoffs into public services [that] should meet both U.S. and corpo-
rate moral standards."1 22 When TI asked industry leaders what countries
engaged in some form of domestic favoritism, the United States topped the
list, followed in respective order by France, Japan, China and Hong Kong,
Germany, Italy, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Spain, Malaysia, Tai-
wan, Singapore, Belgium, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, Aus-
tria, and Switzerland. 123
In March 2000, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency
noted that the U.S. government uses economic information, usually from
freely-available sources, to discover if foreign companies are bribing foreign
public officials to the detriment of U.S. companies. 124 The U.S. govern-
ment presents any evidence of bribery to the foreign government, which
most often reevaluates the contract bids and awards the contract to the
most "meritorious" bidder-often a U.S. company.125 One wonders
whether the U.S. government's activity prompted respondents to character-
ize the United States as an unfair competitor. Exposing bribery may be
considered unfair by the bribers that lose the contract bid process.
WHAT DOES THE DATA SHOW?
1. Privatization alone will not lead to reform. 126
2. There is a synergistic effect between good governance, democracy,
legal and financial stability, and economic growth.
120. Id.
121. SeeJeffrey A. Fadiman, A Traveler's Guide to Gifts and Bribes, 64 HALv. Bus. REv.,
July-Aug. 1986, at 122, 132-36.
122. Id. at 136.
123. See Transparency Int'l, Bribe Payers Survey, supra note 4.
124. See R. James Woolsey, Why We Spy on Our Allies, WAL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2000, at
A18; see also Duncan Campbell & Linda Melvern, America's Big Ear on Europe, NEw
STATESMAN, Dec. 6, 1999, at 47; Peter Clarke, The Echelon Questions, ELECTRONIc ENGI-
NEERING TIMES, Mar. 6, 2000, at 36; Duncan Campbell, Interception Capabilities 2000
(Apr. 1999) <http://www.iptvreports.mcmail.com/interceptioncapabilities-2000.htm>.
125. See Woolsey, supra note 124, at A18.
126. See TRNsnnoN REPORT, supra note 5, at 120.
2000 Bribery and Corruption
3. Bribery and corruption pose a serious threat of derailment to coun-
tries' economic transition. The "bribe tax" places a high cost on new
investment and discourages development, leading to fewer voices support-
ing reform.127
4. Bribes have persisted. Bribes need to be minimized to increase eco-
nomic success, not treated as "a substitute[ ] for more intrusive state
intervention." 128
5. Bribery threatens a country's stability, another factor affecting
development.
6. A sound legal and financial infrastructure is a precondition for eco-
nomic development.
7. Reform responsibility needs to be shared across a broad political
spectrum.129
8. External pressure for conformity to legal and normative standards
set by the EU, OECD, and TI may support the transformation process and
help eliminate bribery.
9. Complete reforms require internal and external pressure.
III. What Is To Be Done?
The challenge for the next century will be to continue the transition that
started in some cases before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. What is to
be done? The solution is not to impose a utopian vision of society with
"new people" who do not bribe or accept bribes. 130 However, like
Chernyshevsky, this conclusion appeals to reason in arguing that bribery
and corruption threaten any substantial efforts of countries to maximize
returns and growth after communism. 131 The economic data underscores
the dramatic progress in countries like Hungary, Estonia, Poland, and the
Czech Republic and the disturbing indicators of deterioration in Russia.
Pushing to reduce or eliminate bribery will necessitate legal reform and
infrastructure changes that strongly correlate with economic development.
Short of a multilateral and multidimensional full-court press to elimi-
nate corruption or make the price too high for individuals to contemplate
bribery, nothing will work effectively.' 32 These transition economies need
to complete their transformation and spur economic growth, assuming the
Asian financial shocks are over and the Kosovo crisis does not erupt and
impede further progress. The following, information details the key ele-
ments of the full-court press.
LEGAL
127. See TaRNsIToN REPORT, supra note 5, at 114; see also supra fig.1.
128. TmaNSITION REPORT, supra note 5, at 124.
129. See id. at 104.
130. See supra note 1 (discussing Chernyshevsky's distinctions between ideal and
practical solutions to bribery).
131. See Katz & Wagner, supra note 1, at 15-21 (discussing Chernyshevsky's stress on
reason and knowledge in effecting social change).
132. See infra fig.2.
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* Pursue multilateral efforts to enact national anti-bribery legislation,
such as the OECD Convention, that will shift the focus to domestic
enforcement and away from the issue of extraterritoriality.
* Continue to monitor and regularly report on bribery enforcement under
the OECD Convention.
* Conform national laws to the OECD Convention.
* Explore the possibility of a U.N. tribunal or developing other interna-
tional mechanisms.
* Expand the role of the EU and Council of Europe through GRECO.
* Implement similar legal changes in non-OECD countries.
* Consider an expanded role for the WTO.
POLInCAL
* Continue the real source of reform: political pressure, which has toppled
governments in Italy, Brazil, Pakistan, and Zaire in part because of popu-
lar reaction to corrupt politicians-"corruption... brings the crowds out
on to the streets." 133
* Increase EU pressure to comply with the OECD Convention as a prereq-
uisite to membership. The EU sponsored the OECD Convention and has
a vested interest in curtailing corruption in Europe. Bribe payers create
briber takers, and this process sets in motion a vicious cycle with the
potential to infect all of Europe with corruption, if left unchecked. Ger-
many's scandal, alleging Chancellor Kohl accepted payments while in
office, demonstrated vividly the cost and destabilizing effect illegal pay-
ments can have on a country. If corruption can cause the downfall of a
major political party in an established democracy, any conceivable effect
on a country precariously balanced and trying to emerge from the
shadow of communism would be disastrous.
Increase media coverage of the costs of bribery. Because corruption "is
the abuse of public office for private gain, its perpetrators have one foot
in the legitimate world; they are thus within reach of incentives or
threats."'134 External events may uncover previously hidden costs of cor-
ruption and lead to major national changes. For example, Turkey's
earthquake revealed the cost of bribes to evade building code inspectors.
As a consequence, Turks no longer subscribe to the concept of "'devlet
baba'-Daddy State."' 3 5
* Involve other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Mac-
Arthur Foundation, in the fight against corruption.' 3 6
ECONOMIC
* Mobilize NGOs to put economic pressure on countries. The NGOs play
an important economic role in many countries, wielding considerable
power that has not been tapped. The analysis of the bribe tax and the
133. A Global War Against Bribery, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1999, at 22.
134. Id.
135. See Stephen Kinzer, The Turkish Quake's Secret Accomplice: Corruption, N.Y.
TiMEs, Aug. 29, 1999, at WK 3.
136. See, e.g., Internet Ctr. for Corruption Research, Internet Center for Corruption
Research <http://www.gwdg.de/-uwvw/> (sponsored by Goettingen University and
Transparency International).
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time tax underscores that corruption is a financial drag on the economic
potential of these transition countries. Transparency International has
spent considerable resources documenting the connection between cor-
ruption and low economic growth, and researchers have coined the
phrase "Bribonomics" to explain it. Furthermore, bribery is a trade
problem.137 Accordingly, organizations like the WTO may be per-
suaded to press reduction of bribery as part of an effort to dismantle
trade barriers and increase transparency.
" Create internal voices for reform. Privatization alone wil not drive out
corruption, although established businesses can play an important role.
For example, Unilever pulled out of Bulgaria rather than deal with the
corrupt environment.138 New business enterprises are a critical element
in the clamor for reform. Thus, both new and recently privatized busi-
nesses can apply economic pressure on the state to change, a resource
that Transparency International tries to tap as an internal voice for
reform. 139
" Use the World Bank and other NGOs to create substantial economic
pressure and rewards for reform.
" Expand investment by private enterprise to reward those countries that
successfully change their legal environment. Failure to address bribery
will lead businesses to forego investment opportunities or reduce
existing investments in a country.
" Carry out economic and civil service reforms.
TECHNOLOGY
* Use technology to identify corruption and bribery, raising the
probability of discovery and making the behavior riskier for individuals.
The IRS has sophisticated data-mining software that can discern unu-
sual patterns. Similar programs could be used by governments to moni-
tor compliance with national laws and the OECD Convention. Bank
secrecy makes cooperation necessary to discover money laundering, and
technology makes the process more transparent and less amenable to
corruption. 14°
" Disseminate information that might otherwise be censored through the
Internet, a fast and efficient means to share information. This threat of
publicly exposing corruption may have political ramifications.
" Use technology to provide feedback to foreign governments regarding
bribery.' 41
137. But see Dani Rodrik, Comments: Dani Rodrik andjames E. Rauch, in CoRRUpION
AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 109, 112.
138. See A Global War Against Bribery, supra note 133, at 24.
139. See Schloss, supra note 41, at 469.
140. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. use of technology
to monitor bribery in other countries).
141. See supra text accompanying note 125.
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ETHIcAL
" Explore the moral arguments against bribery. While moral arguments
alone have not been successful, they should not be ignored. 14 2
* Build a domestic environment instilled with a "childish fear of
corruption." 14 3
Conclusion
Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and the CIS are not alone in suffering the
burden of the "bribe tax"; Europe, Asia, and the Americas are not immune.
However, the data suggests a potentially crippling tax in some of these
transition economies. Failure to address the issue will exact an enormous
price in terms of regional stability. The situation requires more than the
platitudes of Chernyshevsky's "new people" decreeing bribery shall no
longer exist.1 44 Yet economic growth will not extinguish bribery without
other efforts. 145
The international and national actors must implement a legal, politi-
cal, economic, technological, and ethical full-court press. Sanctions must
be coordinated to achieve maximum effect and to reward states for institut-
ing difficult reforms. Fear of exposure and punishment may change only
limited behavior; the benefit of a transparent process in corresponding eco-
nomic growth will also encourage change. An impulse to spur economic
development and trade unfettered by corruption may be the only hope for
these transition countries and parts of Africa. Finally, ethical codes may
help deter bribe payers from offering bribes.
If successful, every country would benefit from the advent of new busi-
nesses and markets. It would be a "win" for the global economy, and the
only identified losers would be individuals whose pockets are no longer
lined with looted lucre. The potential benefits to society and the business
community are clear. Eventually, countries and citizens will insist on an
end to the bribe and time taxes, or the transition countries will revert to the
old ways, and the dream of a market economy will evaporate.
142. See Earle, supra note 6 (discussing the failure of moral arguments to persuade
countries to alter their practices); see also Hess & Dunfee, supra note 34, at 593 (calling
for the adoption by corporations of"C 2 Principles" as a weapon to fight bribery). But cf.
Salbu, supra note 23, at 657 (discussing the limits of legislative solutions).
143. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 1 & note 131 and accompanying text.
145. See RosE-AcamAN, supra note 6, at 226 ("Corruption cannot be expected to
wither away just because ... economic growth is vigorous.").
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